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JURISDICTION
This Appeal is taken from a JUDGMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
entered in the Second Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah, by the Honorable Michael D. Lyon dated June 8, 1993.
NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed July

7,

1993.

A

This Court has

jurisdiction under and pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(j)
and Utah R.App.P. Rule 3.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the Court err in determining the just compensation in an
eminent domain proceeding?
When a Judgment of Just Compensation is "within the range of
evidence11 of value as presented by expert testimony, the judgment
must stand.

(State Road Comm'n v. Hopkins. 29 Utah 2d 131, 507

P.2d 57, 58-59 (1973); State Road Comm'n v. Taggart, 19 Utah 2d
247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment of Just Compensation in an
eminent domain proceeding.

Landowners seek a reversal or additur

for additional damages based upon increased value of junk-yard
property, severance damages, potential future flooding, loss of a
site for a business sign, destruction of the sign, cost of a wall,
and for interest at a rate and application date different than as
-1-

provided by statute.

The matter was tried to the Court and a

Judgment entered.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court properly granted summary judgment on the claim
that eminent domain was barred by an "oral agreement." The subject
properly was valued at its "highest and best" use, was not a
"specialty"

property,

additional

damages were

not proven by

competent evidence and the landowners are not entitled to an
interest rate different than that prescribed by statute.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING DEFENDANTS COUNTERCLAIM WAS PROPER
This is an action in eminent domain commenced by the City to
extend a public street. Landowners asserted, by Counterclaim, that
the City could not condemn their property because of "implied" or
"oral" terms of a land exchange agreement entered into between the
City, landowners and others in May, 1983 (R.76-97).

There is no

term or provision in the 14-page agreement which, even remotely or
impliedly, precludes the City from acquiring future property for
street widening or extension. The Agreement contains the following
integration clause:

-2-

"24. The parties hereby agree that this Agreement shall
be deemed to contain all of the terms and
conditions agreed upon, it being understood that
there are no outside conditions, representations,
warranties, or other agreement, written, oral or
implied.
25. The terms and conditions of this Agreement shall
not be altered in any manner whatsoever except by a
subsequent written supplemental agreement executed
by all of the parties hereto." (R.87, ff24-25.)
As a fully-integrated and complete expression of the agreement
of the parties containing no term or provision prohibiting future
condemnation, the Agreement cannot be augmented by oral testimony
proffered

to vary the Agreement.

(E.I.E. v. St. Benedicts

Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972); State Bank of Lehi v.
Woolsev, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977).)
II.
EVEN IF NOT BARRED BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE,
THE ALLEGED "ORAL AGREEMENT" NOT TO CONDEMN
PROPERTY IN THE FUTURE WOULD BE VOID
Assuming, arguendo,

the existence of an alleged oral or

implied agreement not to condemn made by a City official in 1983,
said agreement could not prohibit or bar the City from thereafter
exercising its public duty and trust to provide public facilities
when the

need arises:
"The general rule that the power of eminent domain
is inalienable applies whether the right is
exercised directly by the legislature or through
its delegated agencies. A municipal or a private
-3-

corporation to which the power of eminent domain
has been delegated cannot lawfully contract that
the power shall not be exercised or that it shall
be restricted.
The power is given as a public
trust to be employed when the public needs require
it; and when such an occasion arises, private
contracts cannot stand in the way. Private parties
cannot, by contract, in any way impair the power of
eminent domain. Contracts attempting to do so are
void as contrary to public policy. Parties cannot
thus prevent available land from being taken or
acquired, in a property proceeding, for a public
use."
(EMINENT DOMAIN, 26 Am. Jur. 2d §17 p.658.)
III.
THE PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY VALUED AT ITS
"HIGHEST AND BEST USE" RATHER THAN AT ITS
POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVE USE AS AN EXTENSION OF AN
EXISTING JUNK YARD
Landowners had used the property to the east of the piece
"taken" as an auto salvage yard, and under their Agreement with the
City were entitled to have the "take" and severed parcel to the
west of the "taken" parcel rezoned to permit that usage.

In

eminent domain proceedings, however, the property must be valued at
its highest and best use which may or may not be its present or
owner-intended use.

(State Road Comm'n v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167,

397 P.2d 463, 464 (1964); Movie v. Salt Lake City. Ill Utah 210,
176 P.2d

882, 887

(1947); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake

County. 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938 (1952); State v. Tedesco. 4 Utah
2d 48, 291 P.2d 1028 (1955).)
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The Landowner's appraiser did not even ascertain the "highest
and best use" of the property prior to opining as to its fair
market value.1 His comparable sales were of commercial properties
rather than junk yard sales.

The City's appraiser repeatedly

opined that he appraised the property at its "highest and best
use,"

which

he

determined

was

at

application not requiring much depth.2

some

limited

commercial

He repeatedly stated that

the property would be more valuable appraised as "commercial," than
as a potential salvage yard (T. 150-51).
IV.
THE "UNIQUE" OR "SPECIALTY USE" DOCTRINE DOES
NOT APPLY TO USAGE WHICH DOES NOT REPRESENT
THE "HIGHEST AND BEST USE" OF THE SUBJECT; OR
WHERE THE SUBJECT IS CAPABLE OF VALUATION
USING TRADITIONAL VALUATION METHODS
Landowners argue that the subject property has a "special use"
(i.e., potential junk-yard) which creates value above the fair
market value of the subject property.

The City's appraiser

disagreed, maintaining that buyers of property with an anticipated

*(T.74-75.) Indeed, Mr. Johnson seemed to have no concept of
his task in eminent domain proceedings. He had never testified in
an eminent domain case (T.61). He took a home study in eminent
domain once he received this assignment (T.61). He inconsistently
claims to have personally appraised 500 properties in 1992 (T.59),
equivalent to 1-1/3 appraisals every day of the year, yet claims to
have spend 50-55 hours doing this appraisal alone (T.59-60).
2

The severed parcel is roughly 39' x 115' at its widest point,
and 29' x 115' at its narrowest point.
-5-

use as junk yard do not pay "commercial" prices and that his
appraisal as "commercial" exceeds junk yard prices.
Plaintiff readily concedes that there exists within eminent
domain valuation law the concept that certain properties are so
"unique" in nature that they cannot be fully valued under the
traditional appraisal methodology by resorting to comparable market
sales,

capitalization

depreciation.

of

income,

or

reproduction

cost

less

This is best summarized in the leading treatise on

eminent domain as follows:
"It occasionally happens that a parcel of real
estate taken by eminent domain is of such a nature,
or is held or has been improved in such a manner,
that, while it serves a useful purpose to its
owner, if he desired to dispose of it he would be
unable to sell it at anything like its real value.
A church, or a college building, or a clubhouse
located in a town in which there was but one
religious society, or college, or club, might be
worth all it cost to its owners, but it would be
absolutely unmarketable. . . . In cases of such a
character, therefore, market value will not
generally be the measure of compensation.
Hence, some other measure is sought and different
means must be resorted to. So it is proper, in
such a case to deduce market value from the
intrinsic value of the property, and its value to
the owners for their special purpose." NICHOLS,
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, §12C.01[1] p.l2C-2-5.
But utilization of the "specialty" valuation (income capitalization
or cost less depreciation) is limited to and governed by several
notable restrictions which are discussed herein:
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(a)

There must

be a showing

that

the

property

cannot be valued by the traditional methods because no
market exists, no rental or income figures exist, and
application of the rule is therefore necessary.
(b)

The property must be "unique"—not merely have some

unique features, for no two properties are identical and every
commercial property has some unique features applicable solely
to the owner's taste or needs.
(c)

Generally the rule is limited to properties like

churches, schools, cemeteries and parks, although it has been
applied to some commercial

applications, but the rule is

limited to "rare" or "exceptional" cases.
A.

The

THE TYPES OF PROPERTIES GENERALLY HELD TO
BE "SPECIALTY" OR "SPECIAL USE" PROPERTIES ARE, CHURCHES, SCHOOLS, CEMETERIES
AND PARKS AND NOT GENERAL COMMERCIAL
PROPERTIES

Courts

have

generally

defined

properties

that

"specialty" as those which meet a four-pronged test:
"We find that there are several tests, all of which
must be met, for an improvement to be considered a
specialty.
(1)

It must be unique;

(2)

There must be no market for it and
no sales;

(3)

it must be specially built for a
special purpose for which it was
designed;
-7-

are

(4)

it must have a special use for that
purpose
(.
.
. and
economic
feasibility at that use . . . ) . "

In re Park Street Vicinity of Bay Lane. Etc.. 325
N.Y.S. 2d 555, 557-58 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1971)
Examples of those types of properties held to be "specialty":
•

Originally designed and constructed Commercial Dry
Cleaning Plant
(City of New Rochelle v. Sound Operating Co. , 293
N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1968))

•

Country Club and Golf Course
(Albany Country Club v. State. 241 N.Y.S.2d
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1963))

604

Drive-In Theatre
(Acme Theatres. Inc. v. State. 297 N.Y.S.2d
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1969))

771

•

•

Dairy and Milk Processing Plants
(Mohawk Milk Association. Inc. v. State of New
York. 153 N.Y.S.2d 725; Normals Kill Farm Dairy
Co. v. State. 279 N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.
1967))

•

Electric Power Plants
(Salzberg v. State. 261 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1963)

•

Stadium (New York City Polo Grounds)
(Matter of New York (Cooaan) . 274 N.Y.S.2d
(1963)

805

•

Beach and Cabana Club
(In Re Park Street Vicinity of Bay Lane, etc.. 325
N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1971))

•

A Wharf-Rail Terminus
(Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Pittsburgh Ft.W.S C.
Ry.Co.. 75 N.E. 248 (1905))

•

A "hurricane proof" Deep Water Wharf
(Wronowski v. Redevelopment Agency, etc., 430 A.2d
1284, 1286 (Conn.Sup.Ct. 1980))
-8

•

Civil War Battle Site and Soldier's Hospital
(Scott v. State, 326 S.W.2d 812 (Ark.1959))

•

Radioactive Fail-Out Shelter with 8" steel and
concrete walls and 4" Water Roof
(State, Dep't of Highways v. Crossland. 207 So.2d
898 (La.1968))

•

Museum
(City of Chicago v. George F. Harding Collection,
217 N.E.2d 381 (1966))

•

School
(County of Cook v. City of Chicago, 228 N.E.2d 183
(Ill.App. 1967))

•

Duck Hunting Club
(Central 111. Light Co. v. Porter, 239 N.E.2d 298
(Ill.Appl. 1968))

Examples

of

those

types

of

properties

held

not

to

be

"specialty11:
•

An Auto Service Station, converted to auto sales,
remodeled to dry cleaning with a drive-up window
(City of Rochester v. S.C.Toth, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d
755# 756 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1977))

•

Dairy Buildings, barns and garage used in dairy
operations
(Van Mol v. Renewal Agency of Kansas City, 402 P.2d
320 (Kan.1965))

•

Stone Monument Manufacturing Plant with Overhead
Moveable Cranes
fin re New York City Terminal Market, 244 N.Y.S.2d
998 (1963))

•

Amusement Park held not to "be like a church or
railway terminal."
(River
Park
Dist.
v.
Brand.
158
N.E.687
(Sup.Ct.111. 1927))

-9-

•

Fish ponds
(State Dep't of Highways v. Noble. 150 S.E.2d 174
(Ga.App. 1966))

•

Soap Factory
fCitv of Chicago
(Sup.Ct.111. 1919))

•

v.

Farwell.

121

N.E.

794

Plumbing Supply Outlet
(In Re Cecil Ave. Renewal Project. N.Y.R.-10, etc.,
317 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1970))

B.

INVOCATION OF THE "SPECIAL USE" (COST
LESS DEPRECIATION) FORMULA FOR DETERMINING VALUE IS RESTRICTED TO "RARE" OR
"EXCEPTIONAL" CASES

While the Courts have uniformly accepted the principal that
the absence of a "market" for property should not bar a recovery
for the property's take, the Courts are quick to point out that
application of the "special use" or "specialty" formula of cost
less depreciation is to be used " . . . only in those rare cases
. . ."

(State

v.

So.Pac.Co.,

445

P.2d

186,

190

(Ariz.App.

1968)(emphasis added)) or the " . . . few exceptional cases . . ."
(City of Chicago v. Farwell, 121 N.E.795, 797 (111. 1919) (emphasis
added).)

Only where

".

. . the character of the property

absolutely precludes any ascertainment of the market value" may the
cost less depreciation be utilized.

(State Ex Rel. Herman v.

So.Pac.Co.. 445 P.2d 186, 189 (Ariz.App. 1968), citing, Pima County
v. DeConcini, 79 Ariz. 154, 285 P.2d 609 (1955); Phoenix Title &

10-

Trust Co. v, State Ex Rel. Herman, 425 P.2d 434 (1967) (emphasis
added).)
C.

What

A THRESHOLD FINDING OF MN0 MARKET" AND/OR
"NO INCOME" DATA IS AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO INVOCATION OF THE "SPECIALTY"
OR "SPECIAL USE" (COST LESS DEPRECIATION)
FORMULA

has been referred

to as ".

. . the meat

of the

[specialty] rule" (Van Mol v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City,
402 P.2d 320, 322 (Kan. 1965)) is a threshold finding, by the
Court, that there is "ftlhe absence of market value, in the sense
that there is a lack of evidence of comparable sales . . . "

(Id at

321) . Only "f i1n the absence of market value, because the special
type of property is not commonly bought and sold . . . " may the
formula be utilized,

(id. at 322) (emphasis is that of the Court) .

Where a building is shown to be able to produce income from a
source other than the proposed

"special use", the cost less

depreciation formula is unavailable as a matter of law.

(In Re New

York Citv Terminal Market, 244 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1000-1001 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.
1963); People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v. Chambers, 83 N.E.2d
839 (N.Y.Supp.Ct. 1964); Matter of New York (Maxwell), 222 N.Y.S.2d
786, 802-803 (1964).)

In this case, the Landowners' own appraiser

found five properties he considered as "comparable" and based his
opinion on that data, never offering a scintilla of evidence of
"income" production or "cost less depreciation" used in the unique
-11-

or specialty property valuations.

Landowners made the "argument"

that the property was unique, but then proceeded to value it using
market

sales

of

commercial

properties—thereby

rebutting

themselves!
D.

UTAH DECISIONS INVOKING THE RULE

Utah has recognized utilization of the inherent value or value
as used theory, but has also noted that its application is invoked
solely because no market exists for valuing the property in any
other method.

In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co.,

566 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1977) the court noted that:
11

. . . there were no sales on the open market of
water or water rights in the aquifer basin in which
Defendant's property was located, and thus no
market value in the usual sense of the term." (Id.
at 1242, citing, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt
Lake County. 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938 (1952);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352
P.2d 693 (1960); and 4 NICHOLS, Eminent Domain.
§12.-32(3) (b) at 12.377-78 (3d ed.)
The Utah Wool Pulling Court expressly found that the business
involved with usage of the water was truly "unique":
"There is ample evidence in the record that
defendants operation was in fact specialty
property. It appears that defendant operated one
of the few wool pulling operations in the nation."
(Supra at 1244.)
Without the prerequisite findings of "specialty" and "no market"
data, utilization of the "value to the owner" is reversible error:
"The appellant also claims it was error for the
Court to allow the landowner to testify that the
-12-

property was worth $120,000 to $125,000. The basis
he gave for the value was: 'Well, it is my life's
work and it provided me a good living. . . . I know
what it is worth to me.' Counsel then asked the
witness: 'And is that what your testimony is based
on, Mr. Johnson, is that what the subject property
is worth to you?' and the witness answered, 'yes.'
The basis upon which the owner stated the value of
the property was not permitted by law. What the
property is worth to a seller is not a correct
basis for an opinion." (Utah State Road Comm'n v.
Johnson. 550 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976), citing U.S.
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90
L.Ed. 729 (1946).)
V.
THE COURT PROPERLY VALUED THE "TAKE" AT ITS
"HIGHEST
AND
BEST
USE"
(COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPMENT) AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO ADD,
INCREMENTALLY, "VALUES" FOR ADDITIONAL "USES"
The value of the "taken" property must be ascertained by
determining its "highest and best use."

The City's appraiser

determined that use to be as a commercial development.

The

Landowner had previously used it as vacant property, but upon which
he located a sign pointing eastward to where his auto salvage
business was located.

The sign was visible from Riverdale Road

(Def.Exh.

Landowner

6).

The

wants

"incremental" value of a "sign site."

compensation

for

the

But the City's appraiser

properly pointed out that the "take" piece was valued at $3.00 per
sq.

ft.

as

"commercially

developable

property";

that

is,

unencumbered with a sign lease in the front of the property which
-13-

would impede its development.

Obviously, no reasonably prudent

buyer would buy a piece of commercial property for development at
premium price if he had to leave the frontage open as a "sign
site."

The City's appraisal also made no "reduction" for a sign

site leasehold along the frontage. Even the Landowner's appraiser
acknowledged that the "take" property, at his $4.50 per sq. ft.
price of $15,500, represented its full market value and it would be
improper to add to that "$6,500 as a sign site" (T.94).

It's one

or the other, but not both.
Moreover, there was no competent testimony from anyone in this
case as to the fair market value of a "sign site." The Landowner's
appraiser merely asked other business owners to "place a value" on
such a sign site (T.53).

The Court allowed the testimony over the

City's objection as hearsay, indicating it went to "weight" rather
than to "admissibility," but ultimately held against the Landowner
on that issue (T.53-54).

The Court should never have admitted the

testimony to begin with:
"Defendants here have attempted to get before the
jury declarations of third parties as to value not
supported by oath and not subject to crossexamination.
As hearsay, this is clearly
inadmissible." (Utah Dept. of Trans, v. Jones, 694
P.2d 1031, 1036 (Utah 1984).)

-14-

VI.
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT INTEREST
ACCRUED AS PROVIDED BY THE STATUTE
Landowners seek interest on this judgment at 12% per annum
from the date of the "take" and cite (Utah State Road Comm'n v.
Fribercr, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1983) for authority.

Fribera is,

itself, an aberration and lends no support to Landowner's position.
A divided court in Fribera took "judicial notice" that in the
double-digit

inflationary

years of the mid- to

late 1970's,

property values in Salt Lake County "increased substantially"

(Id.

at 835), thereby causing an unconstitutional denial of due process
by valuing property on the "date of service of summons" (June 23,
1972) in a trial scheduled some time in the early 1980's.
Fribergs wanted to "contest" the right to take and therefore
left in Court the funds deposited under §78-34-9.

They then, in

fact, contested the take and the proceedings continued for more
than a decade.

This court noted:

"Suffice it to state that valuation as of the
service of summons date will be the rule, and
departure from that rule will be the exception.
Finally, it should be noted that the presumption
established by §78-34-11 may be rebutted either by
the State or by the property owner by showing that
a valuation as of the date of service of summons
would result in an award that would not provide
'just compensation' to a landowner or be fair to
the State. It follows that the burden to rebut the
presumption established by §78-34-1 is on the party
which asserts that valuation as of the date of
service of summons would be unfair." (Id. at 832.)
-15-

In this case, the Landowners offered no evidence that land values
had "substantially increased" between September, 1988 (date of
service of the summons) and November 19, 1992 (date of trial).
Moreover, Landowners repeatedly resisted efforts to consolidate the
condemnation case with a companion quiet title action, and expedite
the trial of this matter.
It cannot
deposited

(R.139, 147, 185).

be seriously

argued

Landowners

left the

funds in court so as to "preserve" their right to

challenge the "right to take."
witness

that

or document

Landowners never offered a single

contesting

the

"right

to take."

Their

examination of Mr. Holmes never really questioned the necessity of
this public street (T.20-22). The "right to take" was "submitted"
to the Court on "uncontroverted" evidence

(T.23).

Landowners

needlessly left funds on deposit which could and should have been
withdrawn after the road was completed in 1989. There is no reason
for the Court to look for a constitutional mandate to create an
"exception" to the UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-9 in regards to the rate
of interest on monies ultimately awarded in excess of the deposited
funds

as

it

did

in

Fribera

based

upon

the

extraordinary

circumstances involved in that case.3

3

Even in Fribera, a divided court did not alter the interest
rate on the judgment, but merely the date of valuation. (Id. at
835[31] last sentence.)
-16-

VII.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE EXTENSION OF 700
WEST IN ANY WAY AFFECTED ALLEGED "POTENTIAL"
DRAINAGE PROBLEMS
In building the Riverdale City offices in 1986, the City
extended and widened 4600 South past the Crabtree Auto Salvage Yard
and

placed

a

catch

basin

Appellant's Brief, p.7).

to

carry

storm

runoff

(see Map,

That was completed in 1986. Landowners,

in this condemnation action, assert a claim for "potential" flood
damage likely to occur in the future because the catch basin is
"too high" and otherwise inadequate.

They cite Utah Dept. of

Trans, v. Jones. 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984) as authority.
The problem with this argument is two-fold.

The engineering

complained of involved a prior project done in 1986. The extension
of 700 West did not impact the engineering and construction of
storm water facilities along 4600 South and there was no expert
testimony that the "take" for 700 West in any way impacted water
runoff.
In Jones, the Court merely held that UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3410(2)4 applies to condemnation actions and permits analysis of

4

"(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the
portio not sought to be condemned by reason of its seerance from
the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." UTAH CODE
ANN. §78-34-10(2) (emphasis added)
-17-

claims arising by the "construction" of the improvement (Id. at
1034) .
Secondly, following construction of the roadway, no water
problem has ever occurred, and the Court determined the claim
"highly speculative" (R.220).

There is no competent testimony in

this case of either reasonable probability of future problem or
actual, non-speculative damages likely to occur.

The landowners

simply failed in their burden on this claim.
VIII.
THE CONCRETE RETAINING WALL WAS NOT AN
IMPROVEMENT WHICH ADDED VALUE TO THE LAND AND
ANY "DAMAGE" TO THE WALL IS PROPERLY ADDRESSED
IN THE JUDGMENT
Landowners seek an increase in the award by $21,200 as the
"value" of a concrete retaining wall which is constructed on the
"take" property and extends east and west onto property which the
landowners own.
the widening

Sixty-six feet of the wall had to be removed for

of the roadway.

However, even the Landowners'

appraiser acknowledged that the concrete wall contributes nothing
to the value of the land (T. 83-84).
According to an engineering report, the wall is unstable, of
poor quality, and should be removed (Ex. 11). The Court properly
determined that the City had some limited obligation as a result of
cutting the wall, i.e. , to "shore up" its two fresh cuts and return
the wall to at least its precondemnation condition (R.219).
-18-

When

the City and Landowers could not agree upon the amount of "cure"
damage following the trial, the matter was brought back before the
Court. The Landowner failed to appear after proper notice (R.227,
28) and the Court determined that the additional "damages" to shore
up a wall, which contributes nothing to the value of the land and
should otherwise be removed as unsafe, was $600 (R,229, 231-32).
Such

additional

sum

became

part

of

the

Judgment

of

Just

Compensation.
IX.
THE LANDOWNERS' SIGN WAS NOT DAMAGED, AND
REMAINS AS DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY
A sign used by Landowners located on the "take" property was
removed by the City.

It was placed upon the Landowners' property

awaiting directions as to its ultimate reuse or other disposition.
The Defendants did not respond and the Court determined that it was
not otherwise "damaged" as a result of the "take."

(Ex. 7; R.220.)

X.
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THERE WAS NO
"SEVERANCE" DAMAGE TO THE REMAINING PROPERTY
The "severed" parcel is approximately 37' x 115' at its east
end and 29' x 115' at its west end (T.95).

Before the take it was

used as parking for properties owned by Crabtree and fronting on
700 West labeled "other Crabtree property" in Appellants Brief,
p.7, Illustration I (T.90).

Its utility as a parking lot is
-19-

unaffected by the condemnation (T.91).

Patrons of the business

facilities adjacent to this property can still park on the property
as they had previously done.

A building could never have been

built on the property before the condemnation because of inadequate
space considering the appropriate
(T.158-59).

zoning setback requirements

Mr. Froer opined that the increased value to the

severed piece occasioned by the improvements and extension of 700
West completely "offset" (as permitted by UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3410(4)) any claim for "severance" (T.160-61).
SUMMARY
The Judgment of Just Compensation is within the "range of
evidence" of value testified to by experts. As the trier of fact,
the trial court's determination of value is entitled to stand if it
is within "range or compass of evidence."

(State Road Comm'n v.

Hopkins, 29 Utah 2d 131, 507 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1973); State Road
Comm'n v. Tacrcrart. 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967).)

The

Landowners have the burden of proof as to a value (Id.; Utah Road
Comm'n v. Hansen. 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963); Tanner v.
Provo Bench Canal & Irrig. Co., 40 Utah 105, 118, 121 P. 584, 589
(1911)).

The Landowners failed to sustain their burden in proving

damages in excess of the judgment and the District Courts decision
should be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?1

day of October, 1993.

\

Q

1

L- _ E t ^ _

HAROLD A. HINTZE
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellee RIVERDALE CITY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following,
first-class mail, postage prepaid:
Donald C, Hughes
795 - 24th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
this Z.7*-

of October, 1993,

HAROLD A. HINTZE
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RIVERDALE CITY, a municipal
Corporation,

;
])

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

]

vs.
CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY, et al. ,

)

Case No.
D£t;

,

Defendant.

880903546

2 8 1992

Riverdale City filed condemnation proceedings to
property belonging to Crabtree Auto Company in order to extend 7 00
West Street to connect with 1050 West in Riverdale City, consistent
with its master plan.

Under an order of occupancy issued by the

court on June 20, 1989, this extension has been accomplished.
The property taken was authorized by law and the taking
of the property was necessary for that use.

The plaintiff is

therefore entitled to possession and ownership of the condemned
property.
In

determining

the

amount

of

just

compensation

to

Crabtree Auto, the court must determine the value of the condemned
property and the amount of the damage, if any, to the remaining
land, or severance damage.

The value of the condemned property is

its highest and best use at the time of the taking on September 23,

1988, when the plaintiff's summons was served.

In condemnation

Memorandum Decision
Case No, 880903546
Page Two
proceedings, the landowner has the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence to establish the highest and best use
of the property.

The defendant's evidence seemed to focus on the

value of the use of the property as part of its salvage business.
This approach is incorrect. A fair market value of the property is
not driven by the value of the property to the owner, but its
highest and best use.
The court finds that the highest and best use of the
property at the time of the taking was a commercial use of $3.00
per

square

foot, probably

for parking

businesses to the north of the property

in connection

with

the

(which is property also

owned by defendant) and for use in connection with the defendant's
salvage business to the east of the property, consistent with its
prior uses.

Applying that monetary value to approximately 3,302.32

square feet within the subject property, the amount of damages
would

be

$9,907

or,

rounded

off,

$10,000

for

the

defendant,

exclusive of severance damage.
The court grants no severance damage, except for the wall
(discussed below), because it finds the difference between the
value of the property prior to the taking and the value of the
remaining property after the taking to be essentially the same.
Prior to the taking, the property just to the east of the taking
was used for storage of vehicles; the property just to the west of
the taking was used for parking by the businesses to the north of

the property and occasionally for vehicle storage for defendant's

Memorandum Decision
Case No- 880903546
Page Three
business.

These basic uses will continue.

Because a 50 foot

setback is required for commercially zoned property and an 80 foot
setback for a manufacturing zoned property (which is the way it is
presently zoned), no building could have been constructed on the
property before, nor will that be possible in the future.
Removal of a section of the wall for 700 West Street has
left the remainder of the two sections of the wall unstable and,
perhaps, unsafe. The court was not impressed, however, that it was
an

expensively

installed

wall

to

begin

with.

deficiencies were noted in ARW Engineer's report.
exhibit

11.)

The

engineer

recommended

Nonetheless, it was a functional wall.

Its

inherent

(See defendant's

removal

of

the

wall.

Because the court recalls

no testimony regarding only the cost of bracing the wall from
either end, the court will order that the plaintiff bear the
reasonable cost of bracing the wall on both ends abutting 700 West
Street, in much the same fashion as the wall was braced at each end
before the wall was cut prior to the taking, by a perpendicular
slab or some other sensible approach.

Alternatively, the cost of

such bracing shall be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant to
defray

the

cost

of moving

the wall, which, according

engineer, can be removed with little effort.

to the

If the parties cannot

agree on the reasonable costs of bracing the wall, the court will
hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
The court allows no damage for the sign site on the

condemned property.

The law allows damages computed only for the

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 880903546
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highest and best use, and putting a sign on the property is not its
highest and best use.

The court's award of damages of $10,000 for

the condemned property is the only appropriate measure of damages
on this issue.
The court likewise grants no damage for the sign.

The

defendant could have removed the sign if it had value or without
incurring expenses, if it would have responded to the plaintiff's
reasonable requests for directions on where to put the removed
sign.

The plaintiff asked the defendant where it wanted the sign

put when it was removed from the condemned site, but it could never
get any answer from the defendant.

Therefore the city laid it to

the side of the road, which was reasonable under the circumstances.
If

the

sign was

subsequently

damaged,

and

the

court was

not

persuaded that it was damaged in looking at plaintiff's exhibit No.
7, it was caused by the defendant's inaction or lack of cooperation
in giving direction to the plaintiff on the relocation of the sign
•once the city was given occupation of the condemned property.
Furthermore, the court suspects that its real value, which no
longer exists, was to aid motorists to find the salvage business to
the east of the sign looking down 700 West Street from Riverdale
Road. (See plaintiff's exhibit 6.)
The court believes that it is highly speculative to conclude
that the installation of the storm sewer and its surrounding paving
of the property exacerbated a potential water problem, just because
there was some flooding in 1986.

Therefore, the court grants no

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 880903546
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damages for this claim.

If flooding occurs in the future, and the

defendant is persuaded that the flooding was caused by the paving
or any other way in which the plaintiff handled the catch basins
and

storm

sewers, the defendant can file a claim

against the

plaintiff at that time.
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare appropriate findings,
conclusions, and a judgment consistent with this decision, which is
intended

only as a framework for the preparation of the final

documents.

Alternatively,

a

judgment

only

for

the

court's

signature can be prepared if both parties can stipulate that no
appeal will be filed.
Dated this

day of December, 1992.

MICHAEL D. LYON, Judgfc
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
RIVERDALE CITY

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

12
STATE OF UTAH

13

14 RIVERDALE CITY, a municipal
15 corporation,
Plaintiff,

16
17

<%

v.

%

18 CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY,

Case No. CV-354688

a Utah corporation,
DOES
1 THROUGH 10,
19

22
23
24 i
25
26
27
281

Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendant.

20
21

JUDGMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Court on November 9, 1992, the Plaintiff being present and
represented

by

Douglas

J.

Holmes,

Esq.,

Riverdale

City

Attorney and Harold A. Hintze, Esq., and the Defendants being
present and represented by Donald C. Hughes, Esq., the Court
having heard the testimony and reviewed the exhibits presented

1
MICROFILM ROLL

2

168

PAGE j j j j "

3
4 at said trial, and having taking the matter under advisement,
*»

and having fully considered the matter, and having rendered

o its MEMORANDUM DECISION on December 24, 1992, and the matter
6 having come back before the Court pursuant to the Court's
7 MEMORANDUM DECISION and NOTICE on May 27, 1993 at the hour of
8 11:30 a.m., the Plaintiff being represented by Douglas Holmes,
9 Esq. and Harold A. Hintze, Esq., the Defendant neither
10 appearing nor being represented by Counsel; the Court having
11 heard the testimony of an engineer concerning the costs of
12 shoring

the

concrete wall

cut

as part

of

the

roadway

13 extension; the Court being duly advised in the premises and
14j good cause appearing therefor; now enters its JUDGMENT OF JUST
15 COMPENSATION as follows:
16

1.

The property herein sought to be acquired by eminent

17 domain is one authorized by law and the acquisition is for a
18| public purpose.
19

2.

The

property

being

acquired

is

approximately

20 3,302.32 sq.ft. in size, and had a fair market value on the
21 date of take of $10,000.
22

3.

The Defendant is not entitled to severance damages

23 as a result of this condemnation, or other damages arising
24 therefrom, other than the cost of bracing the wall, which
251
26
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27
28
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31
J I previously traversed the property being acquired and was cut
D

to accommodate the road extension.

6 cost to brace

1

4.

7

The Court finds that the

said wall is the sum of $600.

Defendant is therefore entitled to a JUDGMENT OF

8

JUST COMPENSATION

for the property

taken

and all of

q

damages associated with the take as follows:

10

(a)

$10,000 for the property taken;

111

(b)

$600 for damages to the existing wall;

121
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

201
21

221

for a total sum of $10,600.

The Clerk of the Court is hereby

directed to return to Plaintiff the $13,875 deposited pursuant
to the ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY issued herein on June 20,
1989

and

all

accrued

interest

less

Court

the Judgment entered herein with all excess funds to remain
the exclusive property of the Plaintiff.
5.

Upon

payment

in full

of

said

JUDGMENT

OF

JUST

COMPENSATION, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to entry of a
FINAL ORDER OF CONDEMNATION

vesting

title to the subject

property, by eminent domain, in the Plaintiff.

24
25
26

28

thereof,

administrative expenses, for use by the Plaintiff to satisfy

23

27

the
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4

MADE AND ENTERED t h i s ^

da

Y o f AjTr^l,

1993.

BY THE COURT:

5
6

r

7

O^-

M i c h a e l D.
Lyon/
Michael
D. Lyon
District Court Judge

8
9

JUDGMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION WAS SUBMITTED TO DEFEN10 THIS
DANTS' COUNSEL FOR APPROVAL FOR MORE THAN FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO

11 SiffiMISSION TO\THISiCOURT.
12

j+w+uA th~2

13 H a r o l d A. H i n t z e
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24]
25!
26
27
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RIVERDALE CITY,

HON. MICHAEL D. LYON

Plaintiff,

Date:

May 27, 1993

vs.

Case no. 880903546

CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY,

Dean 01sen, Reporter

Defendant.

Maureen Magagna, Clerk

HEARING
Harold A. Hintze and Douglas J. Holmes are present
representing plaintiff; defendant is not present nor represented
by counsel.
Mr. Hintze addresses the Court.
Larry Gilson, engineer, is sworn and testifies.
The Court orders that the fair and reasonable cost of the
wall is $600.00, to be paid by Riverdale City to Crabtree.

This

amount may be used to shore up the wall or defray the cost of
removing the wall, pursuant to the Court's original order.
Mr. Hintze explains the order prepared regarding the funds
on deposit.
Mr. Hintze will send a copy of the proposed order to Mr.
Hughes prior to submitting it to the Court.

